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Abstract
I construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model characterized by flexible
prices, search frictions, and nominal wage contracts, and examine to what extent the model
can explain the quantitative business cycle properties of real macroeconomic variables in the
U.S. economy. I consider efficient bargaining that the firm and the worker enter into bargaining
over the future nominal hourly wage rate and future hours worked under the generalized Nash
bargaining framework. The Nash product is assumed to consist of the discounted present value of
the expected match surplus. Under efficient bargaining, the model hardly produces unrealistically
high volatility of real variables or countercyclical productivity because hours per worker are fixed
ahead of time and employment is a slow-moving variable with search frictions. Moreover, efficient
bargaining requires firms to rely on job creation heavily to adjust the wedge between the marginal
product of labor and the real wage rate in response to shocks. As contract length increases, the
volatilities of the unemployment rate and vacancy rate increase significantly, but those of output
and total hours worked do not appreciably change. I also investigate the model under different
assumptions such as the right-to-manage approach, the Nash product with the current value of
match surplus, and instantaneous hiring. Efficient and forward-looking bargaining are important
in accounting for the U.S. business cycle properties.
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1 Introduction
This study investigates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that contains flexible
prices, search frictions, and nominal wage contracts (Cho and Cooley 1995). Janko (2008) argues that
the equilibrium business cycle model with wage contracts, which was motivated by the work of Gary
(1976) and Fischer (1977), does not capture the business cycle statistics of the US economy. This
argument considerably limits the theory. Nominal rigidities improve monetary transmission and am-
plification mechanisms when nominal wage contracts are incorporated into real business cycle models.
However, these models lead to unrealistically high volatility among real variables and countercyclical
productivity. In this paper, a model economy with wage contracting is examined to show that search
frictions and efficient bargaining have important roles in overcoming model limitations.
I follow the existing assumption by adhering to the future nominal wage rate. However, my ap-
proach differs with regard to the contract regime. The nominal wage rate in Cho and Cooley (1995) is
derived from the decision rule of the model without contract by assuming that the contract wage rate
is the expected market-clearing level of the wage rate. However, I derive the contract wage counter-
part from the solution to a forward-looking Nash bargaining problem. This component is important
in explaining why firms and workers enter into nominal contracts. In my model, wage contracts are
based on bargaining conducted by workers and firms because of the coordination failure raised by
labor market frictions.
Forward-looking bargaining is also important in matching the volatility of vacancies with nominal
wage contracts and matching the contributions of intensive and extensive margins of labor hours to to-
tal hours worked. I consider an alternative bargaining problem to examine the role of forward-looking
bargaining. In this problem, the Nash product consists of the current surplus of each party. Moreover,
only currently employed workers and operating firms enter into bargaining. In the current surplus
bargaining model, the bargaining power of a worker varies with contract length in the steady state.
The steady-state nominal wage rate decreases and per-period profits increase significantly with con-
tract length. These features are not observed in the forward-looking bargaining model. A substantial
increase in the steady-state value of per-period profits dampens the volatilities of per-period profits
and vacancies.
This paper also investigates why the incorporation of nominal wage contracts into the equilibrium
business cycle model does not lead to results that match US data. In doing so, the importance
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of labor market frictions and efficient bargaining is emphasized. This approach reveals unexamined
information in literature. Under the nominal contracting arrangements following Cho and Cooley
(1995), employees and firms agree on the nominal hourly wage rate in advance. Furthermore, firms
are free to choose employment on the hours margin at the wage rate. This approach is referred to
as the right-to-manage (RTM) approach. Under the RTM framework, firms adjust to shocks during
the contract period by choosing hours to equate the marginal product of labor to the realized real
wage. Consequently, the volatilities of hours worked and output are unrealistically high. This issue is
raised not only for the flexible price model but also for the New Keynesian model. Christoffel et al.
(2009) examine a New Keynesian model with staggered wages and report that the model, combined
with an RTM assumption, does not replicate the dynamics of hours worked because hours per worker
are too volatile relative to data. On the other hand, the existing RTM framework does not allow
employment to have an effort dimension despite being able to better capture actual labor contracts.1
If labor input varies because of responses in effort and hours, the effect of wage rigidities on hours
worked can be offset by variations in effort at work.2 Therefore, I assume that efficient bargaining
is a reasonable approximation for bargaining. Under efficient bargaining, the nominal wage rate and
work hours are jointly determined. Little attention has been paid to the role of labor market frictions
with efficient bargaining as a way to resolve an unrealistic degree of real variable volatility. Hence,
this paper contributes to the further study of this issue.3
The model no longer generates unrealistically high volatility among real variables and counter-
cyclical productivity when efficient bargaining and nominal wage contracts are incorporated into the
flexible price model. Among all the models with different contract lengths, the volatilities of output
and total hours worked are less than those found in US data. Moreover, productivity remains procycli-
cal during the business cycle. The volatilities of unemployment rate and vacancy rate rise significantly
with increasing contract length.
Efficient bargaining requires firms to rely on job creation heavily to adjust the wedge between
the marginal product of labor and the real wage rate in response to technology and monetary shocks
because hours per worker are fixed ahead of time. After the realizations of shocks, vacancies increase
1Among others, see Trigari (2006) and Christoffel and Kuester (2008).
2Using a DSGE model with endogenous effort, Bils and Chang (2003) show that workers are willing to trade off
exertion and hours in production.
3Krause et al. (2008) analyze a DSGE model with price rigidities, search frictions and efficient bargaining. But
they do not investigate the relationship between nominal wage rigidities and the volatility of output through efficient
bargaining.
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sharply and unemployment decreases. Given that hours per worker are fixed because of efficient
bargaining, an increase in total hours worked is driven primarily by employment. However, employment
per se is unable to generate large fluctuations of output because employment is dictated by a law of
motion in the search and matching framework.
With regard to productivity, technology shocks and monetary shocks notably play different roles
in the model. Although technology shocks directly affect both individual and aggregate outputs,
monetary shocks indirectly increase aggregate output by expanding the number of matched firms.
The output response to monetary shocks is slightly less than the response of total hours worked.
Hence, productivity falls in response to monetary shocks. With regard to technology shocks, which
remain extremely strong with increasing contract length, the output response is much greater than
the response of total hours worked. Thus, productivity becomes procyclical for both shocks.
Several papers in real business cycle literature have studied the implications of nominal wage
contracts in the transmission of monetary shocks. Cho (1993) first examines the quantitative impli-
cations of one-period nominal wage contracts. Cho and Cooley (1995) study the properties of model
economies with nominal wage contracts. Cho et al. (1997) quantitatively estimate the welfare cost
of nominal wage contracting. Janko (2008) provides empirically plausible labor adjustment costs to
the equilibrium business cycle model with wage contracting to overcome several shortcomings that
are present with nominal wage rigidities. However, Janko (2008) does not discuss unemployment and
vacancies.
With respect to labor market frictions, Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996) first bring the concept
into a real business cycle model. Shimer (2005) discusses the lack of an amplification mechanism in
the context of the search and matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Shimer (2005)
finds that the wage bargaining process is a source of inability that amplifies shocks. The bargaining
wage is extremely volatile because it absorbs most of the shocks. Therefore, the cyclical movements
in the incentives of firms to hire are dampened. Consequently, Hall (2005) proposes real wage rigidity,
which allows firms to achieve cyclical movements in their incentives to create jobs. Following Shimer
(2005) and Hall (2005), numerous studies have introduced real and nominal wage rigidities into the
DSGE models.4 To my knowledge, the current paper is the first work that revitalizes DSGE models
4Krause and Lubik (2007), Gertler and Trigari (2009), and Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) focus on real wage rigidities
based on the New-Keynesian DSGE model. Most studies employ Hall (2005)’s notion of a wage norm, but Gertler and
Trigari (2009) assume that in each period a subset of firms and workers renegotiate wage contracts, and modify the
conventional Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model to allow for Calvo-type staggered wage contracts. On the other
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characterized by nominal wage contracts in a frictional labor market environment.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and shows how the nominal wage
rate is derived. Section 3 discusses the calibration and steady-state properties of the model. Section 4
quantifies the model, presents the results, and compares the benchmark model with various versions
of the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
The model economy used in this paper is a variant of the models of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
and Cho and Cooley (1995), which consists of households, firms, and government.
2.1 Households
A representative household consists of a continuum of expected-utility-maximizing infinitely lived indi-
viduals with a measure of one. Each member has time-separable preferences over his/her consumption
ct (i) and her labor supply (ht (i) , nt (i)). Each person may be either employed by a firm nt (i) = 1
with the hours of work ht (i) or unemployed nt (i) = 0. The period utility of each member is given by
the following:  ln ct (i)−B 11+φht (i)
1+φ if nt (i) = 1,
ln ct (i) if nt (i) = 0,
where 1/φ denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of leisure. Following Merz (1995), I
assume that the household serves as a full insurance mechanism by pooling the resources of all its
members. The household allocates total consumption to maximize the sum of household utility, which
can be obtained by equalizing the marginal utility of consumption of each household member. The
household, which makes all members obtain an identical consumption bundle, serves a utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln ct −B h
1+φ
t
1 + φ
nt
}
,
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, ct is consumption, ht is hours worked by each employed household
member, and nt is the fraction of employed household members.
hand, Gertler et al. (2008) and Gal´ı (2010) incorporate nominal wage rigidities into the New-Keynesian DSGE model.
Notice that nominal wage rigidities are introduced in the form of staggered nominal wage setting a` la Calvo.
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Households in this economy are required to hold money to purchase consumption goods and face
a cash-in-advance constraint with the following form:
ct ≤ m˜t−1 + Tt
P˜t
,
where m˜t−1 is money carried over from the previous period, Tt is the lump-sum money transfer, and
P˜t is the price level in period t.
The budget constraint of the representative household can be expressed as follows:
ct + it +
m˜t
P˜t
=
W˜ t−jt
P˜t
nth
t−j
t + (1− nt) b+ rtkt + pit +
m˜t−1 + Tt
P˜t
,
where it denotes investment in capital (kt); nt is the fraction of employed household members; W˜
t−j
t
and ht−jt are the nominal hourly wage rate and work hours, respectively, determined in period t − j
through bargaining; b is household production; rt is the real rental rate of capital; pit is the profits
received by household from firms. The issue of how bargaining occurs over nominal wages and hours
worked will be further analyzed in the next section.
Employment nt evolves according to the following law of motion:
nt+1 = (1− s)nt + ft (1− nt) ,
where s denotes an exogenous separation rate in which employees lose their jobs each period. The
existing workforce at the beginning of period t + 1 is denoted by (1 − s)nt and new hires entering
into employment agreement in period t + 1 are denoted by ft (1− nt), where ft is the job-finding
probability of a worker.
2.2 Firms
A firm (or entrepreneur) produces output yt by using capital kt and hours h
t−j
t under the following
technology:
yt = ztk
α
t
(
ht−jt
)θ
,
where zt is an aggregate productivity shock and h
t−j
t is the hours of work determined through bar-
gaining in period t − j. Without loss of generality, we can conveniently assume that a single firm or
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entrepreneur corresponds to each worker. Therefore, the number of employees is 1 in the production
technology of an individual firm. The productivity shock follows an AR(1) process in logs:
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + εzt ,
where εzt is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance σ
2
z . Technology shock is recognized
at the beginning of each period before decisions are made.
The expected discounted sum of real profits for an individual firm is given by the following:
Jt = ztk
α
t
(
ht−jt
)θ − W˜ t−jt
P˜t
ht−jt − rtkt + β
{
(1− s)Et [ψt+1Jt+1] + sEt [ψt+1Ot+1]
}
, (1)
where ψt+1 ≡ µt+1/µt and Ot+1 is the value of a vacancy in period t+ 1. I assume that matched firms
and workers bargain on the nominal hourly wage rate and work hours. Given the hours of work, the
firms choose the amount of capital.
The value of a vacancy Ot is given by the following:
Ot = −κ+ β
{
qtEt [ψt+1Jt+1] + (1− qt)Et [ψt+1Ot+1]
}
,
where qt is the probability that each vacancy will be filled and κ is the cost of posting a vacancy.
Under equilibrium with no entry barrier, the value of a vacancy must be zero:
κ = βqtEt [ψt+1Jt+1] . (2)
2.3 Government
The government budget constraint for each period is expressed as follows:
Tt = Mt −Mt−1,
where Tt is the lump-sum money transfer and Mt is the stock of money.
5 The government budget
constraint implies that money is injected into the economy through lump-sum transfers. If gt denotes
5As in Cooley and Hansen (1995), I set government spending and nominal government debt to zero for all t.
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the (gross) growth rate of money between periods t−1 and t, money is assumed to grow at rate gt−1:
Mt = gtMt−1.
The growth rate of money gt is known at the beginning of each period. The lump-sum money transfer
Tt is then equal to (gt − 1)Mt−1. The growth rate gt is assumed to evolve according to the following
AR(1) process in logs:
ln gt = ρg ln gt−1 + ε
g
t ,
where εgt is a normal random variable with mean zero and variance σ
2
g . I assume that ε
g
t is independent
of εzt .
2.4 Matching
In this economy, another technology describes how matches occur. The so-called matching technology
or matching function can be expressed as follows:
M (ut, vt) = ηuξtv1−ξt ,
where M (ut, vt) is the total number of matches or hires, ut is the number of unemployed workers,
and vt is the aggregate number of vacancies. Assuming that the size of the labor force is fixed and
normalized to unity, the number of unemployed workers is ut = 1− nt. The probability a firm fills its
vacancy qt is given by the following:
qt =
M (ut, vt)
vt
.
The probability an unemployed worker finds a job ft is expressed as follows:
ft =
M (ut, vt)
ut
.
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2.5 Resource Constraint
Finally, the aggregate resource constraint is obtained by combining the equilibrium budget constraint
of the household and the value of the firm under the binding cash-in-advance constraint:
ct + kt+1 + κvt = yt + (1− δ) kt,
where yt = ntyt is the sum of the output produced by the matched firms and kt = ntkt is the sum of
the capital stock of an individual firm.
2.6 Transformation
All consumption mechanisms for household members are equal through full insurance arrangements.
I focus on the representative household’s problem in equilibrium. To obtain stationary variables in
equilibrium, I divide all nominal variables, namely, m˜t, P˜t, and W˜
t−j
t , by the aggregate money stock
Mt. The maximization problem of the representative household is expressed as follows:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln
(
mt−1 + gt − 1
gtPt
)
−B (h
t−j
t )
1+φ
1 + φ
nt
}
(3)
subject to
mt
Pt
+ kt+1 =
W t−jt
PtΠ
j
i=1gt+1−i
nth
t−j
t + (1− nt) b+ (rt + 1− δ) kt + pit
nt+1 = (1− s)nt + ft (1− nt) ,
where Pt ≡ P˜t/Mt, W t−jt ≡ W˜ t−jt /Mt−j, and mt−1 ≡ m˜t−1/Mt−1. Note that the expression Πji=1gt+1−i
links the real hourly wage rate to the monetary shocks realized between period t− j and period t.6
The representative household aims to choose contingent plans for {kt+1,mt}, which takes the
nominal hourly wage rate and work hours as given. The first-order conditions for the maximization
imply the following:
µt = βEt
[
1
ct+1
Pt
gt+1Pt+1
]
,
µt = βEt [µt+1 (rt+1 + 1− δ)] ,
6Let me define Πji=1gt+1−i = 1 if j = 0.
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where µt is the marginal utility of income in period t, that is, the multiplier attached to the budget
constraint. In equilibrium, mt = Mt = 1. The equilibrium cash-in-advance constraint implies that
consumption is the reciprocal of the price level:
ct =
1
Pt
.
I denote Vt as the worker’s surplus when another household member is employed:
7
Vt =
W t−jt
PtΠ
j
i=1gt−i+1
ht−jt − b−B
(ht−jt )
1+φ
1 + φ
1
µt
+ β (1− s− ft)Et
[
µt+1
µt
Vt+1
]
. (4)
For the value of a matched firm, Eqs. (1) and (2) provide the following expression:
Jt = (1− α) ztkαt
(
ht−jt
)θ − W t−jt
PtΠ
j
i=1gt−i+1
ht−jt + (1− s)
κ
qt
. (5)
Given the hours of work, the first-order condition with respect to kt, which equalizes the marginal
product of capital to its rental rate, is expressed as follows:
rt = αztk
α−1
t
(
ht−jt
)θ
.
The per-period profits pit is given by the following:
pit = (1− α) ztkαt
(
ht−jt
)θ − W t−jt
PtΠ
j
i=1gt−i+1
ht−jt .
2.7 Bargaining over Wages and Hours
The nominal wage contract established in this section follows the study of Cho and Cooley (1995).
The nominal wage contract states that agents agree to a contract arranged for j periods ahead at the
beginning of each period. For example, consider j = 2. At t, workers and firms agree to a nominal
wage rate for period t + 2 and firms pay to employees the nominal wage rate agreed in period t− 2.
At t+ 1, workers and firms agree to a wage rate for period t+ 3. The firms then pay to employees the
7The worker’s surplus can be obtained by taking the derivative of the indirect utility function of the household with
respect to nt subject to the budget constraint and the law of motion for employment. It is expressed in terms of current
consumption of final goods.
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nominal wage rate agreed upon in period t− 1. This process is repeated over time.
Efficient bargaining is assumed once the labor market is characterized by search frictions. In this
approach, the firm and worker enter into bargaining over the nominal hourly wage rate and hours
worked under the generalized Nash bargaining framework. The nominal hourly wage rate W tt+j and
hours worked htt+j in time t + j are agreed upon in period t by both parties, where the hourly wage
rate and hours worked jointly maximize the Nash product after the aggregate shocks are realized:
(
W tt+j, h
t
t+j
)
= arg max
(
βjEt
µt+j
µt
Vt+j
)γ (
βjEt
µt+j
µt
Jt+j
)1−γ
, (6)
where γ denotes the worker’s bargaining power in wage negotiations and the surpluses for a matched
worker and firm are given by Eqs. (4) and (5), respectively. At the time of the contract, the nominal
wage is paid to all employees and employees supply the work as specified in the contract. Under this
nominal wage contract rule, new hires are paid the same nominal wage rate that is predetermined
through bargaining between firms and workers.
The first-order conditions with respect to the nominal hourly wage rate W tt+j and hours of work
htt+j at time t+ j are expressed by the following:
(1− γ)Et
[
µt+j
µt
Vt+j
]
= γEt
[
µt+j
µt
Jt+j
]
, (7)
B
(
htt+j
)φ 1
µt
= Et
[
µt+j
µt
θzt+jk
α
t+j(h
t
t+j)
θ−1
]
. (8)
The nominal hourly wage rate chosen by a firm–worker match is derived from the expected discounted
surplus of firms and workers. The hours of work are chosen by the match such that the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and leisure is equated to the expected discounted value of the
marginal product of labor. In this paper, the economies are approximated by the log-linearization
around the steady state because models with nominal contracts cannot be solved analytically.
I also consider the following alternative bargaining problem:
(
W tt+j, h
t
t+j
)
= arg maxV γt J
1−γ
t . (9)
Unlike Eq. (6), wherein firms negotiate with all potential workers who will be working in period t+ j
regardless of current employment status, Eq. (9) assumes that currently operating firms negotiate
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only with currently employed workers.
Under the alternative bargaining problem, the first-order conditions with respect to the nominal
hourly wage rate and hours of work at time t+ j (j ≥ 1) are expressed as follows:
γJtEt
[
µt+j
µt
htt+j
Pt+j
∏j
i=1 gt+i
j∏
i=1
(1− s− ft+i−1)
]
= (1− γ)VtEt
[
µt+j
µt
htt+j
Pt+j
∏j
i=1 gt+i
(1− s)j
]
, (10)
γJtEt
[
µt+j
µt
j∏
i=1
(1− s− ft+i−1)
{
B
(
htt+j
)φ 1
µt+j
}]
= (1− γ)VtEt
[
µt+j
µt
(1− s)j
{
θzt+jk
α
t+j(h
t
t+j)
θ−1
}]
. (11)
The hours of work determined through bargaining equate the expected discounted value of the
marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption with the expected discounted value of
the marginal product of labor.8
With regard to the steady state under the alternative bargaining problem, the steady-state nominal
wage rate varies with changing contract length. The matched firms and households place different
weights on the continuation values because of the different probabilities of the continuation of their
employment relationships. In the steady state, contract length determines those probabilities. The
steady-state nominal wage rate satisfies the following for j ≥ 1:
γJ (1− s− f)j = (1− γ)V (1− s)j .
I call the model with bargaining problem of Eq. (6) the benchmark model and the model with bar-
gaining problem of Eq. (9) the current surplus bargaining model.
3 Calibration
I set the discount factor β to .99 to imply an interest rate of 1% per quarter. The capital’s share of
total income α is calibrated to be .33, and δ is set equal to .025. I assume that the technology of the
8The log-linearized versions of the hours of work are equalized for Eq. (6) and Eq. (9).
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representative firm exhibits decreasing returns-to-scale. Thus, I set α+θ to .9.9 The worker’s bargaining
power in wage negotiations γ is set to .5, and household production b is set to approximately 40% of
the steady-state (real) bargaining wage. The elasticity of the matching function ξ is set to .5; this value
is consistent with literature. I set the steady-state value of the worker’s job-finding probability f to .6
to imply an average duration of unemployment of 1.67 (Cole and Rogerson 1990). The steady-state
unemployment rate u is set to 6% per quarter. Moreover, the labor force size is normalized to unity.
Given the job-finding rate and employment rate, the exogenous separation s is made constant from
the steady-state version of the law of motion for employment n = f/ (s+ f) such that s = .0383.
The steady-state level of hours worked h is normalized to 1/3, and utility parameter B is adjusted
accordingly. Following Cho and Cooley (1995), I set the intertemporal substitution elasticity of leisure
to .5, thus implying φ = 2. This value is extremely close to Chang and Kim (2006).
The parameters governing the money growth rate, namely, ρg and σg, are set to .49 and .00623,
respectively (Cooley and Quadrini 1999). Finally, parameters ρz and σz, which control the process for
technology shocks, are set to .95 and .007, respectively. These values are commonly used in related
literature. Table 1 summarizes the set of parameters used in the simulation.
I follow Shimer (2005) by calibrating household production b to 40% of the steady-state real
compensation per employee W
p
h, that is, b = .4W
p
h. The steady-state real bargaining wage W/P is
given by 2.01. Hence, the value of household production is .27. The endogenously determined parameter
of the utility function B is 24.87. Therefore, disutility from working in terms of current consumption
of final goods is .22.10 The sum of household production and disutility from working is equal to .49,
which corresponds to the flow utility from leisure or nonmarket activity in the standard search and
matching model. The benchmark model generates the capitalized value of a matched job J of .277 and
production per period net of capital cost (1− α) kαhθ of .68. Note that the surplus from employment
V is equal to J because the worker’s bargaining power is set to .5. Thus, per-period profits (pi) and
vacancy posting cost (κ) are given by .013 and .165, respectively.
9This assumption is not critical in this study, but is made for the comparison with the model economies with wage
bargaining only (the right-to-manage approach). The value of a matched firm becomes zero under the RTM approach
if the firm’s technology exhibits constant returns-to-scale.
10See Appendix for the steady-state conditions for the benchmark model.
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4 Findings
I investigate the extent in which the model economy with wage contracts, as well as frictional labor
markets, amplify monetary and real shocks (Cho and Cooley 1995). Table 2 presents the standard
deviations of output and other key variables of interest. To evaluate predictive accuracy, I first present
the relevant statistics obtained from quarterly US data between 1956 and 2005. The output measure
(y) is production (real output) in the non-farm business sector. Consumption (c) is the sum of the
personal consumption expenditures of nondurables and services, which are deflated by the associated
price indexes plus real government consumption expenditures. Investment (i) is the sum of the real
private domestic investment and real personal consumption expenditures of durables. Employment (n)
is measured by using the quarterly average number of non-farm employees. Hours (h) are the average
weekly hours for the non-farm business sector. Unemployment (u) is the quarterly averages of monthly
data from the Current Population Survey. Vacancy (v) is the quarterly average of monthly help-wanted
indexes constructed by the Conference Board. The real wage (w) is the real hourly compensation in
the non-farm business sector. Finally, the level of price (P ) is measured by the CPI divided by M1
money stock for consistency with the counterpart of the model. All data are seasonally adjusted and
HP filtered with smoothing parameter 1,600.
The summary statistics for the models subject to both monetary and technology shocks, monetary
shock only, and technology shock only are presented. Statistics for the model economies are computed
by simulating for 200 periods and by repeating the simulation 1,000 times.11 This approach highlights
the role of each shock and enables the determination of the relative importance of each shock with
the introduction of nominal wage contracts and search frictions.
4.1 Wage Contracts and Role of Search Frictions
I begin by investigating a DSGE model with money and nominal rigidity following Cho and Cooley
(1995). I also introduce search frictions into the model in which firms choose the amount of hours, such
as Trigari (2006), Christoffel and Kuester (2008), and Christoffel and Linzert (2010). Blanchard and
Fischer (1989) argue that actual labor contracts appear only to set wages and leave the employment
decision to the firm. This approach is referred to as the RTM approach, wherein the firm and union
bargain over the wage, and the firm chooses employment freely to maximize profit. Hence, Cho and
11I generate a set of artificial time-series data of the length of 1,000 periods and drop the first 800 periods.
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Cooley (1995) examine nominal contracts with the RTM approach.
From a DSGE model with money and nominal contracts following Cho and Cooley (1995), I find
unrealistically high fluctuations in output and total hours worked upon the incorporation of nominal
wage contracts.12 In the case of two-period contracts, output is more than twice as volatile as in
the model without contracts. Table 2 shows that the volatility of output increases from 1.30 for no
contract to 2.83 for two-period contracts. On the other hand, total hours worked in the two-period
contract case fluctuate more than output. The relative volatility of total hours worked is 1.30 for
two-period contracts, which is greater than .46 for no contract. These dramatic increases in volatility
are attributed to the RTM approach and the strong monetary transmission mechanism induced by
nominal wage contracts.
Under the nominal contracting arrangements in Cho and Cooley (1995), households and firms
enter into a wage contract and agree upon the nominal wage set in advance. The workers are assumed
to cede the firm the right to determine the aggregate hours, thus leaving firms to maximize profits.
The firms adjust to shocks during the contract period by choosing total hours worked Qt to equate
the marginal product of labor to the realized real wage as follows:
W ct
Pt
= (1− α) ztkαt Q−αt , (12)
where W ct denotes the specified equilibrium nominal wage and Qt = ntht. Nominal wage and total
hours worked become highly volatile even for relatively minor shocks upon the introduction of nominal
contracts. This increase can be attributed to the response of firms to shocks by choosing aggregate
hours worked along Eq. (12). Consequently, the volatilities of total hours worked and output are
unrealistically high.
In the model with contracts, monetary shocks play significant roles in generating high volatilities
in output and other variables compared with technology shocks as contract length increases. For
instance, the volatility of output by both shocks is 3.60 for the case of four-period contracts. The
volatility of output driven only by monetary shocks is 3.09. Hence, a sizable share is explained by
monetary shocks.
Table 3 reports the correlations with output. One of the notable features of the model characterized
by the RTM setup is that total hours worked are strongly positively correlated with output. The
12See Appendix for a detailed description of the model.
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correlations of total hours worked with output are .94 and .96 for two-period contracts and four-period
contracts, respectively. On the other hand, the correlation of labor productivity with output becomes
negative with nominal contracts. Although positive technology shocks cause higher labor productivity,
a positive shock to the money growth rate decreases nominal and real wages. The cyclical behavior of
labor productivity and real wages are identical. Thus, labor productivity becomes countercyclical.13
Procyclical total hours worked and countercyclical labor productivity imply a negative correlation
between labor productivity and aggregate labor.
I introduce search frictions into the model with money and nominal contracts and assume that
bargaining occurs over the nominal hourly wage rate only to maximize the Nash product:
W tt+j = arg max
(
βjEt
µt+j
µt
Vt+j
)γ (
βjEt
µt+j
µt
Jt+j
)1−γ
.
The resulting optimality condition with respect to the nominal wage rate is the same as Eq. (7). The
employment decision is left to the firm. Hence, the amount of hours worked is chosen by the firm. The
condition states that hours per worker are determined to equate the marginal product of labor with
the bargained wage:
W t−jt
Pt
∏j
i=1 gt−i+1
= θztkt
α
hθ−1t ,
where the left-hand side is the real bargained wage and the right-hand side is the marginal product
of labor. Unlike frictionless labor markets wherein firms choose total hours worked (Qt = ntht),
employment (nt) in frictional labor markets is a state variable and not an individual firm’s choice
variable. The cyclical changes in real wages induced by both technology and monetary shocks are
absorbed mainly by the movements of hours per worker. Therefore, the high volatility of total hours
worked is predicted.
Another feature is the lack of an amplification mechanism associated with fluctuations in unem-
ployment and hiring activity. Under the RTM approach, period profits of matched firms are given by
(1− α− θ) ztktαhθt , which can be expressed as follows:(
1− α− θ
θ
)
W t−jt
Pt
∏j
i=1 gt−i+1
ht. (13)
13Bils and Chang (2003) also show that a model with sticky wages but no effort response predicts a strong negative
relationship between labor productivity and hours worked.
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Wage costs are proportional to the revenue and per-period profits; thus, the percentage fluctuations in
wages are equal to the percentage fluctuations in per-period profits. If wages per employee
W t−jt
Pt
∏j
i gt−i+1
ht
do not fluctuate significantly over the business cycle, per-period profits will not fluctuate enough to
generate incentives for the firms to create jobs. Table 2 shows that the model with wage bargaining
only is unable to amplify the effect of shocks on unemployment and vacancies.
Table 2 presents the standard deviations of output and other variables. The results from the model
with wage bargaining only are similar to those from the model without search frictions. Hours per
worker and total hours worked fluctuate more than output and their data counterparts. For example,
in the four-period contract case, hours worked and total hours worked fluctuate more than one and
a half times output. The volatility of output also rises with increasing contract length because hours
worked are volatile. Table 2 also shows that the model with RTM bargaining fails to amplify the effect
of technology and monetary shocks on unemployment and vacancies over the business cycle. In the
four-period contract case, the relative standard deviations of unemployment and vacancies are .21 and
.39, respectively.
With regard to correlations with output, the model with search frictions along with RTM bar-
gaining also predicts that total hours worked are significantly positively correlated with output, labor
productivity is negatively correlated with output, and labor productivity and total hours worked move
in opposite directions (Table 3).
The results show that the model characterized by the RTM regime is unable to account for rea-
sonable fluctuations in real variables and correlations with output over the business cycle regardless
of the existence of search frictions. I employ the model with search frictions and efficient bargaining
in this study. The nominal wage rate and hours of work are jointly determined in this model.
4.2 Wage Contracts and Efficient Bargaining
Table 5 presents the results from the benchmark model with period-by-period wage bargaining. The
results show that labor market variables have low volatility. Compared with the output volatility,
the relative standard deviations of total hours worked (nh), unemployment (u), and vacancies (v)
are .26, .94, and 1.78, respectively. Hence, the model in which the nominal wage rate and hours of
work are Nash-bargained in every period lacks amplification mechanisms.14 This result is consistent
14In order to have highly volatile labor market variables, Cooley and Quadrini (1999) set the worker’s bargaining
power (or the sharing parameter in their paper) in the range of 0.01-0.1. Decreasing this parameter leads to the higher
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with that of Gal´ı (2010), who states that realistic labor market frictions have limited effects on the
equilibrium dynamics of the economy. The benchmark model shows that monetary shocks are not
propagated in this economy. Technology shocks generate most of the observed volatility in output
(y). The benchmark model with both shocks produces essentially the same results as the model with
technology shocks only.
When search frictions and efficient bargaining are considered in the model, nominal wage contracts
increase the volatility of variables but do not produce unrealistically high volatilities in output and
total hours worked. In the four-period contract case, the volatility of output and the relative volatility
of total hours worked are 1.03 and .43, respectively. As regards labor market variables, nominal wage
contracts result in high degrees of volatility. The volatilities of employment (n), unemployment, and
vacancies increase to .41, 6.35, and 15.66 under the four-period contract scenario, respectively. The
corresponding effect on the volatilities of unemployment and vacancies is notably large.
Table 5 also shows that nominal wage contracts along with efficient bargaining play important roles
in amplifying monetary shocks. In the case of four-period contracts, monetary shocks have more weight
in generating fluctuations in employment, unemployment, and vacancies than technology shocks. The
effect of monetary shocks on the volatilities of the labor market variables, including real wages, is
more significant than the effect of technology shocks.
Under efficient bargaining, the introduction of nominal wage contracts slightly decreases the volatil-
ity of output from 1.09 to 1.01 for two-period contracts because hours worked are predetermined
through bargaining. All else being equal, the volatility of hours worked plays an important role for
capturing the volatility of output. The hours of work for the multi-period contract case are less depen-
dent on the state variables, including shock components, than those for the period-by-period contract
case. For example, in the case of two-period contracts, the hours of work in period t+2 are determined
in period t when workers and firms form their expectations about the shocks to be realized two periods
volatility of both employment and unemployment. Note that the weaker bargaining power workers hold, the more rigid
real wages become when the worker’s period value from unemployment is not time-varying. Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008) also set the worker’s bargaining power to .052 in their proposed calibration strategy. As discussed by Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008), the the bargaining weight parameter determines the volatility of real wages. All else being equal,
lower values of the bargaining parameter imply more cyclical real wages and less cyclical profits. The purpose of this
paper is not to account for the cyclical properties of unemployment and vacancies, but to show that the search and
matching model with nominal wage contracts and efficient bargaining is able to predict a low volatility of hours worked
and output as well as generate procyclical productivity.
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later. The log-linearized model expresses hours worked as follows:
(φ+ 1− θ) ĥtt+2 = Etµ̂t+2 + Etẑt+2 + αEtk̂t+2.
Given that all shocks have zero mean, the second term of the right-hand side representing the ex-
pected value of future technology shocks is equal to ρ2z ẑt. Moreover, under the rational expectations
assumption, the current state variables become less persistent. The hours of work for multi-period
contracts are also less dependent on the state variables, thus generating less volatile work hours and
leading to less volatile output (Table 5).
Nominal wage contracts and efficient bargaining lead to significant changes in the relative volatility
of real wages. None of the models with different contract lengths is able to match the relative volatility
observed in US data. For example, for four-period contracts, the real wage rate depends on the nominal
wage rate determined in period t − 4, monetary shock components, and other state variables. With
increasing contract length, the long-term monetary shocks realized from t − 4 through t lead to
significant fluctuations in the real wages.
Table 6 shows the correlations with output. Under the RTM setup, I observe that productivity
is negatively correlated with total hours worked and that real wages and productivity are negatively
correlated with output (Table 3). By contrast, the benchmark model with different contract lengths
correctly predicts a positive correlation between output and productivity, with .97 for two-period
contracts and .90 for four-period contracts. However, in response to monetary shocks, productivity
exhibits a countercyclical behavior. This countercyclical behavior becomes strong with increasing
contract length. If monetary shocks dominate, countercyclical productivity will occur.
The last column of Table 6 shows the correlation between productivity and total hours worked.
The correlation coefficient of .98 supports a strong positive relationship with total hours worked in
the benchmark model of period-by-period bargaining. However, correlation decreases with increasing
contract length. The correlation simulated from the model with four-period contracts (i.e., .15) is close
to the observed level from the data (i.e., .27). The real wage rate is highly procyclical in the benchmark
model of period-by-period bargaining with a correlation of .99 but its procyclicality weakens with
increasing contract length. The correlation between output and real wages is .02 for four-period
contracts; thus, real wages appear acyclical.
The model predicts the low volatility of hours worked (h), and the volatility of hours worked
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relative to employment (n) decreases with increasing contract length. This reduction in volatility
comes at the expense of reducing the correlation of output and hours per worker and the correlation
of output and employment. A trade-off between the capability of the model to match volatilities and
its capacity to generate correlations is emphasized.
Although models with nominal wage contracts and efficient bargaining overcome the limitations
observed in Cho and Cooley (1995) successfully, the setup predicts the weak correlations of unem-
ployment and vacancies with output as contract length increases. The correlations of unemployment
and vacancies are −.84 and .90 for period-by-period bargaining, respectively, but are −.49 and .18
for four-period contracts, respectively. Nevertheless, the model with four-period contracts shows sig-
nificant negative correlations of unemployment for each shock, with −.99 for monetary shocks and
−.71 for technology shocks. 15 A similar trade-off between correlations and volatilities is apparent
in unemployment and vacancies with increasing contract length. Compared with the model of the
RTM regime or other models investigated in the following sections, this trade-off does not seem to be
common to all models with nominal rigidities.
Table 7 shows the correlations with unemployment. For different contract lengths, the model can
account for a negative relationship between unemployment and total hours worked. The correlation
between unemployment and total hours worked in the model with four-period contracts is −.93, which
is close to the level seen in the US data (i.e., −.94). As contract length increases, the volatilities of
employment and unemployment become more driven by monetary shocks than technology shocks,
whereas hours worked remain less volatile for either shock. Thereafter, the cyclical behavior of total
hours worked is explained mainly by the cyclical behavior of employment, that is, employment moves
in the opposite direction of unemployment over the business cycle.
The model is unable to produce a negative relationship between unemployment and vacancies (i.e.,
the Beveridge curve). To observe the Beveridge relationship, unemployment should be significantly
countercyclical and vacancies should be significantly procyclical. All the models investigated in this
paper do not generate such features successfully. Moreover, the benchmark model predicts a positive
relationship between unemployment and real wages. The correlation is −.13 for the US economy
over the last 50 years, whereas the correlation is .21 for two-period contracts and .69 for four-period
15As contract length increases, vacancies are more correlated with output for monetary shocks only and similarly
correlated for technology shocks only. When both shocks are in place, however, the aggregate correlation somehow goes
down. This can happen because both positive shocks produce counteractive effects on the correlations of output with
vacancies as in Table 6. The impulse response functions in Figure 1 also show these counteractive effects.
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contracts. The results are different from the data, but the model with technology shocks only predicts
a weak negative correlation between unemployment and real wages.
Impulse Response Functions
This study investigates how shocks are propagated by nominal contracts and efficient bargaining in the
model economy. For several key variables, such as output, hours worked, and productivity, the impulse
response functions for innovations in monetary shocks and technology shocks are shown in Figure 1.
The two-period and four-period contracting economies, as well as the economy with period-by-period
efficient bargaining, are displayed in Figure 1.
The impulse response functions to innovations in technology shock are shown in Figure 1(a). With
regard to output, total hours worked, and productivity, the model economy with nominal contracts
does not increase the propagation of technology shocks dramatically. However, for unemployment and
vacancies, the model is able to propagate technology shocks. Under efficient bargaining, per-period
profits of matched firms (Eq. (13)) fluctuate significantly in response to shocks. Thus, the incentives
generated by an increase in per-period profits lead the firms to post vacancies.
The second panel (Figure 1(b)) shows the impulse response functions to innovations in monetary
shocks. The model economy with period-by-period efficient bargaining confirms the fact that the
basic real business cycle model characterized by frictional labor markets does not propagate monetary
shocks at all. However, the introduction of nominal wage contracts makes a significant difference.
In response to monetary shocks, output and total hours worked exhibit a hump-shaped pattern. In
the two-period and four-period contracting economies, the response of total hours worked is slightly
greater than the response of output. Thus, productivity falls. Considering the nominal wage rate and
hours of work through bargaining, innovations in monetary shocks have a strong negative effect on
real wages, thus decreasing real wages. This situation in turn increases the incentive of firms to post
vacancies. As a consequence of monetary shocks, vacancies increase and unemployment decreases.
Sensitivity Analysis
I report a sensitivity analysis conducted to examine the robustness of results to the use of other
parameter values. I consider different values of γ to represent the bargaining power of workers, different
values of ξ to represent the matching function elasticity with respect to unemployment, and different
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values of θ to represent the hours elasticity of the production function.
Figure 2(a) shows that the volatilities of output, total hours worked, unemployment, and vacancies
rise sharply with increasing worker bargaining power. However, this phenomenon does not occur for
the model with period-by-period bargaining. A high value of γ with four-period contracts produces
unrealistically volatile unemployment and vacancies. If the bargaining power of workers is strong under
efficient bargaining, a relatively small amount of rigidity will be necessary to cause the real side of
the economy to generate the volatilities of the magnitude observed.
When considering correlations, the contemporaneous relationships among output, hours, and pro-
ductivity are sensitive to a significant change in γ in the four-period contract case (Figure 2(b)). In
the four-period contract case, the strong positive correlations between output and hours per worker
and between output and productivity disappear when the bargaining power of workers is close to one.
Furthermore, the weak positive relationship between productivity and total hours worked becomes a
negative correlation.
Figure 3 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis conducted with respect to matching function
elasticity. Figure 3(a) shows that the volatilities of output, total hours worked, unemployment, and
vacancies increase with decreasing unemployment elasticity. Similar to the bargaining power of work-
ers, this phenomenon occurs only to the model with nominal rigidity. For example, a low ξ value
with four-period contracts leads to large fluctuations in unemployment and vacancies. The positive
correlation coefficients between output and hours per worker and between output and productivity
decrease substantially with low ξ values (Figure 3(b)).
Figure 4 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis with respect to the labor share that determines
the returns-to-scale of the production function. The benchmark parameter is set to .66; thus, the
production function exhibits decreasing returns-to-scale of .99. Unlike the sensitivity analyses with
respect to the bargaining power of workers or the matching function elasticity, a change in the labor
share does not show a noticeable change in the volatilities of key variables and the contemporaneous
correlations among them. Under the RTM approach, the production function should have decreasing
returns-to-scale; otherwise, the value of a matched firm is zero and the firm has no incentive to post
a vacancy. The assumption of a decreasing returns-to-scale production function is required under the
RTM approach. However, Figure 4 shows that the restriction is unnecessary under efficient bargaining.
Contract length really matters because a sensitivity analysis depends on contract length. The
results are more likely to be sensitive to the changes in parameter values with increasing contract
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length. Nevertheless, the simulation results are insensitive to the slight changes in parameter values
around the benchmark calibration.
4.3 Bargaining over Current Surplus
In this subsection, I consider an alternative bargaining problem under which the Nash product consists
of the current surplus of each party (Eq. (9)). Only currently employed workers and currently operating
firms enter into bargaining and negotiate over the current joint surplus.
One of the major differences in bargaining over current surplus compared with bargaining over
future surplus is that some probabilities are attached to the first-order condition with respect to the
nominal hourly wage (Eq. (10)). The probabilities attached to the current surplus of firms denote the
weights on the future match surplus of workers. The probabilities attached to the current surplus of
workers denote the weights on the future match surplus of firms. This result leads to an interesting
feature that the steady-state bargaining wage rate depends on the exogenous separation rate and job-
finding probability, which play important roles in decreasing the actual bargaining power of workers
with increasing contract length. The steady-state nominal wage rate satisfies the following equation:[
γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)j]
J = (1− γ)V,
where γ denotes the ex-ante bargaining power of workers and j denotes the contract length. When
contract length increases, the actual bargaining power of workers decreases. Thus, the steady-state
nominal wage rate decreases. However, the match surplus of firms increases with contract length
because per-period profits increase. In the steady state, I observe that per-period profits significantly
rise with increasing contract length. Per-period profits are .075 for two-period contracts and .214 for
four-period contracts.
An increase in the steady-state value of per-period profits decreases the volatilities of per-period
profits and vacancies. Table 5 shows that real wages and hours worked fluctuate significantly with in-
creasing contract length. Thus, the real compensation per employee wtht also fluctuate significantly.
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However, an increase in the volatility of the real compensation per employee is attenuated by the
increase in the steady-state value of per-period profits. This phenomenon can be understood by ex-
16The standard deviation of the real compensation per employee increases from 1.65 for two-period contracts to 2.18
for four-period contracts.
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amining the percentage fluctuations in per-period profits pit:
pit =
y
pi
(ŷt − n̂t)− rk
pi
(
r̂t + k̂t − n̂t
)
− wh
pi
(
ŵt−jt + ĥ
t−j
t
)
,
where variables with hats denote log deviations from their steady-state values. The coefficient on
the real compensation per employee wh/pi plays an important role in decreasing the amplitude of
fluctuations in per-period profits. The coefficient is 8.19 for two-period contracts, but decreases to
2.20 for four-period contracts because the nominal wage rate decreases and per-period profits increase
significantly in the steady state. The decrease in the coefficient dominates the increase in volatility of
the compensation per employee. Thus, per-period profits and vacancies fluctuate less for four-period
contracts than for two-period contracts.
The second moments of variables from the model with bargaining over current surplus are shown
in the second panel of Table 5 to 7. Compared with the results from the model with bargaining over
discounted expected future surplus, the model with bargaining over current surplus seems to have
similar quantitative implications. Nevertheless, the current surplus bargaining model has a limitation
on matching the volatility of vacancies with nominal wage contracts and matching the contributions
of intensive and extensive margins of labor hours to total hours worked. However, the benchmark
model with forward-looking Nash bargaining performs better in such dimensions. When hours worked
are fixed ahead of time through forward-looking Nash bargaining, firms have to rely on job creation
more heavily to adjust the marginal product of labor in response to shocks.
4.4 Instantaneous Hiring
In the standard search and matching model, a one-period lag is observed between hiring and employ-
ment. For the model economy analyzed in this study, a one-period lag is equivalent to a lag of three
months because the model runs at quarterly. Given that the nominal wage rate and hours of work
are predetermined through bargaining, economic activity does not respond in the period when the
shocks occur. Thus, I introduce instantaneous hiring into the model and examine how much of the
attenuation in output fluctuations is driven by a lag between hiring and employment.
Following Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) and Krause et al. (2008), I assume that vacancies are filled
immediately by paying the hiring cost. Separation occurs at the beginning of period t. Job searchers
in period t consist of those who separate at the beginning of period t and those who are unemployed
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at the end of period t− 1. Job searchers can be expressed as follows:
uot = 1− nt−1 + s · nt−1,
where 1 − nt−1 denotes the unemployed at the end of period t − 1 and s · nt−1 denotes workers
who separate at the beginning of period t. The beginning-of-period job searchers uot find employment
with probability ft and start working in the same period. The standard measure of unemployment is
expressed by the following:
ut = 1− nt.
I make a distinction between unemployment ut and beginning-of-period job searchers u
o
t . The job-
finding probability is given by the following:
ft =
mt
uot
,
where mt =M (uot , vt). Aggregate employment in period t is then expressed as follows:
nt = (1− s)nt−1 +mt. (14)
In contrast to Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010) and Krause et al. (2008), I express the cost per hire as
a function of the vacancy-filling probability qt and assume that the cost per hire is κ/qt.
17 The match
surplus of workers and match value of firms should be discussed because instantaneous hiring makes
17It can be shown that given matching function mt = η(u
o
t )
ξ
v1−ξt , the cost per hire, κ/qt, is equivalent to κη
1
1−ξ f
ξ
1−ξ
t ,
which is a function of the job-finding probability.
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the timing of events completely different. The match surplus of workers is expressed as follows: 18
Vt =
W t−jt
Pt
∏j
i=1 gt−i+1
ht−jt − b−B
(
ht−jt
)1+φ
1 + φ
1
µt
+ βEt
[
µt+1
µt
(1− s) (1− ft+1)Vt+1
]
.
The match value of firms is expressed by the following:
Jt = yt −
W t−jt
Pt
∏j
i=1 gt−i+1
ht−jt − rtkt + β (1− s)Et
[
µt+1
µt
Jt+1
]
.
Given that the free-entry condition holds and hiring is instantaneous, the value of a vacancy becomes
zero and the following relationship holds:
κ
qt
= Jt.
When considering bargaining, the hourly wage rate and hours worked jointly maximize the Nash
product (Eq. (6)). The first-order condition with respect to the hours of work is shown in Eq. (8). Even
under contemporaneous hiring, the hours of work are determined by using Eq. (8), thus implying that
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure should be equal to the marginal
product of labor.
The second moments of variables simulated from the model wherein hiring is contemporaneous
are shown in the bottom panel of Table 5 to 7. Compared with the benchmark model wherein a one-
period lag between hiring and employment is observed, instantaneous hiring does not make a significant
difference in fluctuations and correlations. If bargaining occurs over hours per worker and wages, the
optimal hours satisfy the condition that equalizes the marginal product of hours worked with the
marginal rate of substitution of workers between leisure and consumption even though instantaneous
hiring is introduced.
18If a worker, unemployed in period t, finds a job with probability ft+1 at the beginning of period t+1, (s)he becomes
employed in period t+1. With probability 1−ft+1 (s)he remains unemployed in period t+1. The value of an unemployed
worker Ut is expressed as follows:
Ut = b+ Et
[
µt+1
µt
{
ft+1Et+1 + (1− ft+1)Ut+1
}]
,
where E denotes the value from working. A worker, employed in period t, continues to work with probability 1 −
s (1− ft+1). With probability s (1− ft+1) (s)he will be unemployed next period. The value of an employed worker is
given by the following:
Et = W
t−j
t
Pt
∏j
i=1 gt−i+1
ht−jt −B
ht−jt
1+φ
1 + φ
1
µt
+ βEt
[
µt+1
µt
{(
1− s (1− ft+1)
)Et+1 + s (1− ft+1)Ut+1}] .
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When hiring is instantaneous, aggregate employment in period t follows the law of motion (Eq. (14)),
where the total number of hires mt = u
o
tft captures those who search and find employment at the
beginning of period t, and start working in the same period. Therefore, in frictional labor markets,
employment can be more volatile when hiring is instantaneous than when hiring is not. Table 5 shows
that instantaneous hiring causes significant volatility in employment, that is, the relative volatility
of employment (n) increase from .15 for period-by-period bargaining to .87 for four-period contracts.
An increase in employment variability contributes to increased volatilities of total hours worked and
output.
As far as correlations with output are concerned, total hours worked are more procyclical and
unemployment is more countercyclical in the model with contemporaneous hiring than in the bench-
mark model with a one-period lag. Some of the differences of the two models come from the cyclical
movements of real wages and productivity. In the four-period contract case, the model with instanta-
neous hiring predicts that real wages are countercyclical with a correlation of −.21 and productivity is
weakly procyclical with a correlation of .50. The weak procyclicality of productivity points to a nega-
tive correlation with total hours worked. However, in the two-period contract case, the model is able
to show the positive relationship between productivity and total hours worked and other correlations
with output.
5 Conclusion
The DSGE model examined in this study is characterized by flexible prices, search frictions, and
nominal wage contracts. This study assumes efficient bargaining under which the trade takes place
between the firm and worker in both the wage rate and hours of work. Considering search frictions,
a firm-worker pair negotiates its future nominal wage rate on the basis of the expected value for the
future match surplus. Once the flexible price model accounts for search frictions, efficient bargaining,
and nominal wage contracts, the model hardly produces unrealistically high volatility of real variables
or countercyclical productivity. In the model, the volatilities of the unemployment rate and vacancy
rate increase significantly with contract length. However, the volatility of output does not increase for
a long contract period.
To examine the role of efficient bargaining, I use the model with the RTM approach. The firm and
workers bargain over wages and then the firm chooses employment freely to maximize profit. Without
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search frictions, the model with the RTM regime generates unrealistically high fluctuations in output
and total hours worked, similar to that obtained by Cho and Cooley (1995), because firms adjust the
marginal product of labor in response to shocks by choosing total hours worked. The model with the
RTM regime does not perform well with search frictions in terms of the volatilities of output and total
hours worked, as well as those of unemployment and vacancies. Under the RTM scheme, wages per
employee and per-period profits do not fluctuate enough to generate incentives for the firms to create
jobs. The model with frictions and the RTM approach is also unable to amplify the effect of shocks
on unemployment and vacancies.
Forward-looking bargaining is important to match the volatility of vacancies with nominal wage
contracts and to match the contribution of intensive margin of hours per worker to total hours worked.
Forward-looking bargaining has a useful feature wherein the steady state of the model is independent
of contract length. To observe what happens when an alternative bargaining problem is considered,
I examine a bargaining problem on the basis of the current surplus through the match. If a firm-
worker pair bargains on the basis of the current surplus, the steady-state nominal wage rate falls with
increasing contract length. Moreover, the steady-state value of per-period profits increases significantly
with contract length. A significant increase in the steady-state value of per-period profits decreases
the volatilities of per-period profits and vacancies.
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A Steady States, Linearized Economies and Contract Wages
The appendix presents the steady states of the model economies both with nominal wage contracts
in the frictionless labor markets and with efficient bargaining in which the nominal hourly wage rate
and the hours of work are jointly determined, and the equilibrium conditions linearized around the
steady states.
A.1 Cho-Cooley Economy
The representative household’s maximization problem is given by
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln
(
mt−1 + gt − 1
gtPt
)
−BQ
1+φ
t
1 + φ
n−φt −D
n1+τt
1 + τ
}
subject to
mt
Pt
+ kt+1 =
W ct
Pt
Qt + (rt + 1− δ) kt
Qt = ntht.
The representative firm maximizes its profit each period:
max Ptztk
α
t Q
1−α
t −W ctQt − rtkt.
Both processes governing monetary and technology shocks are the same.
In equilibrium, the model economy is characterized by the following equations. For the households,
the cash-in-advance constraint and the first-order conditions with respect to nt, ht, kt+1, and mt are
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expressed as follows:
ct =
1
Pt
,
B
φ
1 + φ
h1+φt = Dn
τ
t ,
Bhφt = µt
Wt
Pt
, (A-1)
µt = βEt [µt+1 (rt+1 + 1− δ)] ,
µt = βEt
[
Pt
gt+1
]
.
For the firms, the production function, total hours worked, and the first-order conditions with respect
to capital and total hours worked are given by
yt = ztk
α
t Q
1−α
t ,
Qt = ntht,
rt = αztk
α−1
t Q
1−α
t ,
Wt
Pt
= (1− α) ztkαt Q−αt .
Finally, the resource constraint and the law of motion for the capital stock are written as follows:
yt = ct + it,
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + it.
Notice that when nominal wage contracts are introduced into the model economy, the households are
not allowed to choose hours worked and thus I do not take into account the household’s first-order
condition with respect to hours worked, Eq. (A-1).
Steady State
From the household’s first-order condition, the real interest rate is given by r = 1/β − 1 + δ. The
representative firm’s optimality condition yields the capital-labor ratio, k/Q = (α/r)1/(1−α), where k
is pinned down because n(employment rate) and h(hours worked) are set to .94 and 1/3, respectively,
and Q = nh. The real wage rate, which is equal to the marginal product of labor, is given by
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W/P = (1− α) (k/Q)α. Given the steady state capital stock, the steady state level of consumption is
determined by the resource constrain: c/k = (k/Q)α−1 − δ. The steady state value of the multiplier
attached to the budget constraint, µ, is derived from the first-order condition with respect money, so
that µ = β/c.
The first-order conditions with respect to the number of workers (n) and hours worked (h) are
given by
B = h−φµ
W
P
,
D =
(
B
φ
1 + φ
h1+φ
)
n−τ ,
from which utility parameters, B and D, can be determined.
Contract Wages
Following Cho and Cooley (1995), I assume that the contract wage rate is the expected value of the
wage rate when there is market clearing. Thus, the contract wage can be determined from the decision
rules of the model economy without contracts.
• No Contracts:
lnWt = 1.3189− 0.1332 ln kt + 0.3549 ln zt−1 + 0.3736εzt
+0.2281 ln gt−1 + 0.4656ε
g
t
• One-Period Contract Wage:
lnWt = 1.3189− 0.1332 ln kt + 0.3549 ln zt−1
+0.2281 ln gt−1 − εgt
• Two-Period Contract Wage:
lnWt = 1.3043− 0.1265 ln kt−1 + 0.3220 ln zt−2
+0.8397 ln gt−2 − 1.49 ln gt−1 − εgt
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• Three-Period Contract Wage:
lnWt = 1.2903− 0.1201 ln kt−2 + 0.2916 ln zt−3
+0.8994 ln gt−3 − ln gt−2 − 1.49 ln gt−1 − εgt
• Four-Period Contract Wage:
lnWt = 1.2771− 0.1141 ln kt−3 + 0.2633 ln zt−4
+0.9287 ln gt−4 − ln gt−3 − ln gt−2 − 1.49 ln gt−1 − εgt
A.2 Benchmark Model
Steady State
Given the steady state job-finding rate (f) and the employment rate (n), the exogenous separation is
derived from the employment dynamics:
s =
1− n
n
f,
If the vacancy-unemployment ratio, v/(1 − n), is set to unity, then the job-finding rate and the job-
filling rate are equalized, f = q. From the household’s first-order condition, the real interest rate is
given by r = 1/β − 1 + δ. Given the steady state hours of work (h), the individual firm’s demand for
capital (k) is equal to
k =
(α
r
)1/(1−α)
h
θ
1−α .
The aggregate capital stock, output, and investment are given by k = nk, y = kαn1−αhθ, and i = δk,
respectively.
The steady state bargained wage and hours of work satisfy
W
P
h = γ
(
(1− α)y + f κ
q
)
+ (1− γ)
(
b+B
h1+φ
1 + φ
1
µ
)
,
B
µ
= θk
α
hθ−1−φ.
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In the steady state, the free-entry condition can be expressed as
κ
q
= β
{
(1− α)y − W
P
h+ (1− s) κ
q
}
=
β
1− β (1− s)
{
(1− α)y − W
P
h
}
.
Assuming that b ≡ ρW
P
h with ρ the ratio of household production and substituting κ/q in the bargained
wage for the free-entry condition, the steady state real wage, W
P
, solves the following:
[
1− (1− γ)ρ+ γβf
1− β (1− s)
]
W
P
h = γ(1− α)y
(
1 +
βf
1− β (1− s)
)
+ (1− γ)B h
1+φ
1 + φ
1
µ
.
Given the real bargained wage, the vacancy posting cost κ is determined by
κ = q
β
1− β (1− s)
{
(1− α)y − W
P
h
}
.
From the market clearing condition, the aggregate consumption is given by
c = y − i− κv.
The steady state level of price is P = 1/c, and the Lagrange multiplier is then µ = β/P . The parameter
of the utility function B is determined by
B = µθ
(
k
n
)α
hθ−1−φ.
Linearized Model Economy
In this subsection, the log-linearized model economy with efficient bargaining is presented. The log-
linearized equations of the representative household’s first-order conditions are given by
µ̂t = P̂t − Et [ĝt+1] , (A-2)
µ̂t = Etµ̂t+1 + (βr)Etr̂t+1. (A-3)
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The log-linearized cash-in-advance constraint and budget constraint (resource constraint in equilib-
rium) are given by
ĉt = −P̂t,
ŷt =
c
y
ĉt +
i
y
ît +
κv
y
v̂t.
Output, the free-entry condition, and capital demand are given by
ŷt = ẑt + αk̂t + (1− α) n̂t + θĥt−jt ,
− κ
βq
q̂t = (1− α) y
n
Et (ŷt+1 − n̂t+1)− W
P
hEt
(
ŵt+1−jt+1 + ĥ
t+1−j
t+1
)
− (1− s) κ
q
Etq̂t+1 +
κ
βq
(Etµ̂t+1 − µ̂t) ,
r̂t = ẑt − (1− α) k̂t + (1− α) n̂t + θĥt−jt ,
where wt+1−jt+1 denotes the real wage in t+ 1 determined in period t+ 1− j. The law of motion for the
capital stock and the shock processes are
k̂t+1 = (1− δ) k̂t + δ̂it,
ẑt = ρz ẑt−1 + εzt ,
ĝt = ρgĝt−1 + ε
g
t .
The linearized labor market variables are summarized by
M̂t = ξût + (1− ξ) v̂t,
n̂t+1 = (1− s− f) n̂t + sf̂t,
ût = − n
1− nn̂t,
f̂t = M̂t − ût,
q̂t = M̂t − v̂t.
The linearized nominal wage and hours worked should depend on contract length.
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• Period-by-Period Bargaining:
W
P
h
(
Ŵ tt − P̂t + ĥtt
)
= γ (1− α) y
n
(ŷt − n̂t) + γf κ
q
(
f̂t − q̂t
)
+ (1− γ) B
µ
h1+φ
1 + φ
(
(1 + φ) ĥtt − µ̂t
)
(1− θ + φ) ĥtt = ẑt + α
(
k̂t − n̂t
)
+ µ̂t
ŵtt = Ŵ
t
t − P̂t.
• One-Period Contract Model:
W
P
hEt
(
Ŵ tt+1 − ρgĝt − P̂t+1 + ĥtt+1
)
= γ (1− α) y
n
Et (ŷt+1 − n̂t+1) + γf κ
q
Et
(
f̂t+1 − q̂t+1
)
+ (1− γ) B
µ
h1+φ
1 + φ
Et
(
(1 + φ) ĥtt+1 − µ̂t+1
)
(1− θ + φ) ĥtt+1 = ρz ẑt + α
(
k̂t+1 − n̂t+1
)
+ Etµ̂t+1
ŵt−1t = Ŵ
t
t−1 − ĝt − P̂t.
• Two-Period Contract Model:
W
P
hEt
(
ŵtt+2 + ĥ
t
t+2
)
+ γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
W
P
hEt
[
ŵtt+2 + ĥ
t
t+2 +
ŵt−1t+1 + ĥ
t−1
t+1
β(1− s)
]
= γ (1− α) y
n
Et (ŷt+2 − n̂t+2) + γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
(1− α) y
n
Et
[
ŷt+2 − n̂t+2 + ŷt+1 − n̂t+1
β(1− s)
]
+γ
κ
q
fEtf̂t+2 − γ (1− s) κ
q
Etq̂t+2 + γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
J
β(1− s) q̂t
+ (1− γ) B
µ
h1+φ
1 + φ
Et
(
(1 + φ) ĥtt+2 − µ̂t+2
)
+γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
JEt
[
µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1 + µ̂t+1 − µ̂t
β(1− s)
]
(1− θ + φ) ĥtt+2 = ρ2z ẑt + αEt
(
k̂t+2 − n̂t+2
)
+ Etµ̂t+2
ŵt−2t = Ŵ
t
t−2 − ĝt−1 − ĝt − P̂t.
where ŵtt+2 = Ŵ
t
t+2 −
(
ρg + ρ
2
g
)
ĝt − EtP̂t+2 and ŵt−1t+1 = Ŵ t−1t+1 − (1 + ρg) ĝt − EtP̂t+1.
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• Three-Period Contract Model:
W
P
hEt
(
ŵtt+3 + ĥ
t
t+3
)
+γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
W
P
hEt
[
ŵtt+3 + ĥ
t
t+3 +
ŵt−1t+2 + ĥ
t−1
t+2
β(1− s) +
ŵt−2t+1 + ĥ
t−1
t+1
β2(1− s)2
]
= γ (1− α) y
n
Et (ŷt+3 − n̂t+3)
+γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
(1− α) y
n
Et
[
ŷt+3 − n̂t+3 + ŷt+2 − n̂t+2
β(1− s) +
ŷt+1 − n̂t+1
β2(1− s)2
]
+γ
κ
q
fEtf̂t+3 − γ (1− s) κ
q
Etq̂t+3 + γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
J
β2(1− s)2 q̂t
+ (1− γ) B
µ
h1+φ
1 + φ
Et
(
(1 + φ) ĥtt+3 − µ̂t+3
)
+γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
JEt
[
µ̂t+3 − µ̂t+2 + µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1
β(1− s) +
µ̂t+1 − µ̂t
β2(1− s)2
]
(1− θ + φ) ĥtt+3 = ρ3z ẑt + αEt
(
k̂t+3 − n̂t+3
)
+ Etµ̂t+3
ŵt−3t = Ŵ
t
t−3 − ĝt−2 − ĝt−1 − ĝt − P̂t.
where ŵtt+3 = Ŵ
t
t+3 −
(
ρg + ρ
2
g + ρ
3
g
)
ĝt − EtP̂t+3, ŵt−1t+2 = Ŵ t−1t+2 −
(
1 + ρg + ρ
2
g
)
ĝt − EtP̂t+2, and
ŵt−2t+1 = Ŵ
t−2
t+1 − ĝt−1 − (1 + ρg) ĝt − EtP̂t+1.
• Four-Period Contract Model:
W
P
hEt
(
ŵtt+4 + ĥ
t
t+4
)
+γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
W
P
hEt
[
ŵtt+4 + ĥ
t
t+4 +
ŵt−1t+3 + ĥ
t−1
t+3
β(1− s) +
ŵt−2t+2 + ĥ
t−2
t+2
β2(1− s)2 +
ŵt−3t+1 + ĥ
t−3
t+1
β3(1− s)3
]
= γ (1− α) y
n
Et (ŷt+4 − n̂t+4)
+γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
(1− α) y
n
Et
[
ŷt+4 − n̂t+4 + ŷt+3 − n̂t+3
β(1− s) +
ŷt+2 − n̂t+2
β2(1− s)2 +
ŷt+1 − n̂t+1
β3(1− s)3
]
+γ
κ
q
fEtf̂t+4 − γ (1− s) κ
q
Etq̂t+4 + γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
J
β3(1− s)3 q̂t
+ (1− γ) B
µ
h1+φ
1 + φ
Et
(
(1 + φ) ĥtt+4 − µ̂t+4
)
+γ
(
1− s− f
1− s
)
JEt
[
µ̂t+4 − µ̂t+3 + µ̂t+3 − µ̂t+2
β(1− s) +
µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1
β2(1− s)2 +
µ̂t+1 − µ̂t
β3(1− s)3
]
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(1− θ + φ) ĥtt+4 = ρ4z ẑt + αEt
(
k̂t+4 − n̂t+4
)
+ Etµ̂t+4
ŵt−4t = Ŵ
t
t−4 − ĝt−3 − ĝt−2 − ĝt−1 − ĝt − P̂t.
where ŵtt+4 = Ŵ
t
t+4 −
(
ρg + ρ
2
g + ρ
3
g + ρ
4
g
)
ĝt − EtP̂t+4, ŵt−1t+3 = Ŵ t−1t+3 −
(
1 + ρg + ρ
2
g + ρ
3
g
)
ĝt −
EtP̂t+3, ŵ
t−2
t+2 = Ŵ
t−2
t+2 − ĝt−1 −
(
1 + ρg + ρ
2
g
)
ĝt − EtP̂t+2 and ŵt−3t+1 = Ŵ t−3t+1 − ĝt−2 − ĝt−1 −
(1 + ρg) ĝt − EtP̂t+1.
A.3 Search Frictions and Current Surplus Bargaining (Not For Publica-
tion)
Steady State
All other conditions except for the nominal wage rate are the same as those appearing on the bench-
mark model with future surplus bargaining. The steady state bargained wage is given by
W
P
h
[
(1− γ) (1− s)j (1− ρ) + γ (1− s− f)j
(
1 + f
β
1− β(1− s)
)]
= γ (1− s− f)j
(
1 + f
β
1− β(1− s)
)
(1− α) y
n
+ (1− γ) (1− s)j B h
1+φ
1 + φ
1
µ
for j ≥ 1.
Linearized Model Economy
• One-Period Contract Model:
W
P
hEt
(
F̂t + µ̂t+1 − µ̂t + ŵtt+1 + ĥtt+1
)
= γ (1− α) y
n
Et
(
F̂t + µ̂t+1 − µ̂t + ŷt+1 − n̂t+1
)
+ (1− γ) bEt
(
F̂t + µ̂t+1 − µ̂t
)
+ (1− γ)B h
1+φ
1 + φ
1
µ
Et
(
F̂t + µ̂t+1 − µ̂t + (1 + φ) ĥtt+1 − µ̂t+1
)
+γ (1− s) κ
q
Et
(
F̂t + µ̂t+1 − µ̂t − q̂t+1
)
− (1− γ) β f
1− s− f V Et
(
F̂t + F̂t+1 + F̂t+2 + µ̂t+1 − µ̂t − q̂t+1
)
−γ κ
βq
(
F̂t − q̂t
)
+ (1− γ)V Et
(
F̂t + F̂t+1 − q̂t
)
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and
(1− θ + φ) ĥtt+1 = ρz ẑt + α
(
k̂t+1 − n̂t+1
)
+ Etµ̂t+1
where F̂t = − f1−s−f f̂t and ŵtt+1 = Ŵ tt+1 − ρgĝt − EtP̂t+1.
• Two-Period Contract Model:
(1− s) βW
P
hEt
(
F̂t+1 + µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1 + ŵtt+2 + ĥtt+2
)
+ (1− γ) 1− s
1− s− f
W
P
hEt
(
ŵt−1t+1 + ĥ
t−1
t+1
)
+ γ
W
P
hEt
(
F̂t+1 + ŵ
t−1
t+1 + ĥ
t−1
t+1
)
= γ (1− α) y
n
Et
(
F̂t+1 + ŷt+1 − n̂t+1
)
+γβ (1− s) (1− α) y
n
Et
(
F̂t+1 + µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1 + ŷt+2 − n̂t+2
)
+ (1− γ) 1− s
1− s− f BEt
(
(1 + φ) ĥt−1t+1 − µ̂t+1
)
+ (1− γ) β(1− s) (b+B)Et(F̂t+1 + µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1 + B
b+B
(
(1 + φ) ĥtt+2 − µ̂t+2
))
+γβ(1− s)2κ
q
Et
(
F̂t+1 + µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1 − q̂t+2
)
− (1− γ) β2(1− s) (1− s− f)V Et
(
F̂t+1 + F̂t+2 + F̂t+3 + F̂t+4 + µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1 − q̂t+2
)
−γ κ
βq
Et
(
F̂t+1 − q̂t − (µ̂t+1 − µ̂t)
)
+ (1− γ) 1− s
1− s− f V Et
(
F̂t+1 + F̂t+2 − q̂t − (µ̂t+1 − µ̂t)
)
and
(1− θ + φ) ĥtt+2 = ρ2z ẑt + αEt
(
k̂t+2 − n̂t+2
)
+ Etµ̂t+2
where ŵtt+2 = Ŵ
t
t+2− ρgĝt− ρ2gĝt−EtP̂t+2, ŵt−1t+1 = Ŵ t−1t+1 − ĝt− ρgĝt−EtP̂t+1, and B = B h
1+φ
1+φ
1
µ
.
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• Three-Period Contract Model:
(1− s)βW
P
hEt
(
F̂t+2 + µ̂t+3 − µ̂t+2 + ŵtt+3 + ĥtt+3
)
+ (1− γ) 1− s
1− s− f
W
P
hEt
(
ŵt−1t+2 + ĥ
t−1
t+2
)
+ γ
W
P
hEt
(
F̂t+2 + ŵ
t−1
t+2 + ĥ
t−1
t+2
)
= γ(1− α)y
n
Et
(
F̂t+2 + ŷt+2 − n̂t+2
)
+γβ(1− s)(1− α)y
n
Et
(
F̂t+2 + µ̂t+3 − µ̂t+2 + ŷt+3 − n̂t+3
)
+ (1− γ) 1− s
1− s− f BEt
(
(1 + φ)ĥt−1t+2 − µ̂t+2
)
+ (1− γ) β(1− s) (b+B)Et(F̂t+2 + µ̂t+3 − µ̂t+2 + B
b+B
(
(1 + φ)ĥtt+3 − µ̂t+3
))
+γβ(1− s)2κ
q
Et
(
F̂t+2 + µ̂t+3 − µ̂t+2 − q̂t+3
)
− (1− γ) β2(1− s) (1− s− f)V Et
(
F̂t+2 + . . .+ F̂t+6 + µ̂t+3 − µ̂t+2 − q̂t+3
)
−γ κ
βq
Et
(
F̂t+2 − q̂t+1 − (µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1)
)
+ (1− γ) 1− s
1− s− f V Et
(
F̂t+2 + F̂t+3 + F̂t+4 − q̂t+1 − (µ̂t+2 − µ̂t+1)
)
and
(1− θ + φ) ĥtt+3 = ρ3z ẑt + αEt
(
k̂t+3 − n̂t+3
)
+ Etµ̂t+3
where ŵtt+3 = Ŵ
t
t+3 −
(
ρg + ρ
2
g + ρ
3
g
)
ĝt − EtP̂t+3, ŵt−1t+2 = Ŵ t−1t+2 −
(
1 + ρg + ρ
2
g
)
ĝt − EtP̂t+2, and
B = B h
1+φ
1+φ
1
µ
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• Four-Period Contract Model:
(1− s)βW
P
hEt
(
F̂t+3 + µ̂t+4 − µ̂t+3 + ŵtt+4 + ĥtt+4
)
+ (1− γ) 1− s
1− s− f
W
P
hEt
(
ŵt−1t+3 + ĥ
t−1
t+3
)
+ γ
W
P
hEt
(
F̂t+3 + ŵ
t−1
t+3 + ĥ
t−1
t+3
)
= γ(1− α)y
n
Et
(
F̂t+3 + ŷt+3 − n̂t+3
)
+γβ(1− s)(1− α)y
n
Et
(
F̂t+3 + µ̂t+4 − µ̂t+3 + ŷt+4 − n̂t+4
)
+ (1− γ) 1− s
1− s− f BEt
(
(1 + φ)ĥt−1t+3 − µ̂t+3
)
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses
(a) Technology Shock Only
(b) Monetary Shock Only
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Figure 2: Sensitivity Analysis – Bargaining Power of Workers
(a) Standard Deviations
(b) Correlations
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Figure 3: Sensitivity Analysis – Matching Function Elasticity
(a) Standard Deviations
(b) Correlations
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Figure 4: Sensitivity Analysis – Production Function Elasticity
(a) Standard Deviations
(b) Correlations
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Table 1: Parameter Values
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Benchmark Cho-Cooley Wage Only Current Surplus Instant. Hiring
2-Period (4-Period)
Frictions Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Bargaining (W,h) – W only (W,h) (W,h)
Predetermined Parameters
β .99 .99 .99 .99 .99
δ .025 .025 .025 .025 .025
ξ .5 – .5 .5 .5
α .33 .33 .33 .33 .33
θ .66 .67 .66 .66 .66
γ .5 – .5 .5 .5
f .6 – .6 .6 .6
n .94 .94 .94 .94 .94
h 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
φ 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
τ – 1.2 – – –
ρz .95 .95 .95 .95 .95
ρg .49 .49 .49 .49 .49
σz .007 .007 .007 .007 .007
σg .00623 .00623 .00623 .00623 .00623
Parameters Determined Endogenously
B 24.8688 24.906 29.5269 26.537 (31.329) 25.3538
D 0 .6624 0 0 0
κ .1647 – .1267 .924 (2.656) .1583
s .0383 – .0383 .0383 .0957
w 2.0138 2.0203 2.0230 1.830 (1.411) 1.9707
b .2685 – .2697 .244 (.188) .2628
Notes: β denotes the discount factor, δ the depreciation rate of capital, ξ the elasticity of the matching
function, α the capital share, θ the share of hours worked, γ worker’s bargaining power, f the job-
finding probability, n the employment rate, φ the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
of leisure, ρz the persistence parameter of technology shocks, ρg persistence parameter of shocks to
the money growth rate, σz (conditional) standard deviation of technology shocks, σg (conditional)
standard deviation of the shock to the money growth rate, B utility parameter, κ vacancy posting cost,
s the exogenous separation rate, w real bargaining wage, and b household production. See Appendix
for parameters τ and D.
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Table 2: Standard Deviations – RTM
Relative to the Volatility of Output
y c i n h nh u v w a P P
P−1
U.S. Economy 2.09 .36 2.86 .61 .24 .74 5.31 6.36 .43 .50 1.43 .51
Cho-Cooley Model – No Frictions & Right-To-Manage
No Contracts
Both shocks 1.30 .40 3.39 .33 .13 .46 – – .56 .56 .40 .33
Monetary shock only .02 14.05 41.65 .95 .38 1.32 – – .89 .89 14.05 15.89
Technology shock only 1.30 .33 3.32 .33 .13 .46 – – .56 .56 .33 .21
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks 2.83 .20 4.15 .93 .37 1.30 – – .48 .48 .20 .14
Monetary shock only 2.27 .13 4.46 1.08 .43 1.51 – – .52 .52 .13 .12
Technology shock only 1.70 .28 3.53 .55 .22 .78 – – .40 .40 .28 .18
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks 3.60 .19 4.05 .97 .39 1.36 – – .48 .48 .19 .12
Monetary shock only 3.09 .15 4.22 1.07 .43 1.50 – – .51 .51 .15 .09
Technology shock only 1.83 .28 3.54 .58 .23 .81 – – .34 .34 .28 .17
Search Frictions & Right-To-Manage (Wage Bargaining Only)
Period-by-Period
Both shocks 1.46 .40 3.28 .03 .56 .58 .41 .76 .43 .43 .40 .32
Monetary shock only .02 11.93 34.53 .05 1.20 1.20 .74 1.36 .69 .69 11.93 13.49
Technology shock only 1.46 .35 3.23 .03 .56 .57 .41 .75 .43 .43 .35 .22
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks 2.70 .22 4.10 .01 1.29 1.29 .23 .42 .49 .49 .22 .16
Monetary shock only 2.14 .13 4.47 .01 1.53 1.53 .08 .16 .54 .54 .13 .12
Technology shock only 1.64 .32 3.38 .02 .70 .71 .36 .67 .37 .37 .32 .20
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks 3.34 .21 4.01 .01 1.36 1.36 .21 .39 .49 .49 .21 .13
Monetary shock only 2.87 .16 4.20 .01 1.52 1.52 .12 .23 .53 .53 .16 .09
Technology shock only 1.70 .31 3.39 .02 .72 .73 .36 .66 .34 .34 .31 .20
Notes: Data (1956:I-2005:IV) are seasonally adjusted and HP filtered with smoothing parameter
1,600. y = production in non-farm business; c = real personal consumption expenditures of non-
durable goods and services + real government consumption expenditures; i = real gross private
investment + real personal consumption expenditures of durables ; n = employed persons in the
non-farm business sector; h = average weekly hours; nh = total hours worked; u = unemployed per-
sons from the Current Population Survey; v = help-wanted indices; w = real hourly compensation;
a = labor productivity (y/nh); P = price level measured by CPI; P/P−1 = inflation rate.
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Table 3: Correlations with Output – RTM
correlations with output
c i n h nh u v w a P PP−1 (a, nh)
U.S. Economy .65 .94 .78 .72 .87 -.84 .90 .24 .70 -.37 .23 .27
Cho-Cooley Model – No Frictions & Right-To-Manage
No Contracts
Both shocks .75 .97 .98 .98 .98 – – .99 .99 -.75 -.35 .93
Monetary shock only .96 -.95 .74 .74 .74 – – .02 .02 -.96 -.64 -.66
Technology shock only .90 .99 .98 .98 .98 – – .99 .99 -.90 -.55 .94
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks .23 .99 .94 .94 .94 – – -.47 -.47 -.23 -.43 -.73
Monetary shock only -.47 .99 .99 .99 .99 – – -.98 -.98 .47 -.24 -.99
Technology shock only .83 .99 .93 .93 .93 – – .69 .69 -.83 -.67 .38
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks .39 .99 .96 .96 .96 – – -.65 -.65 -.39 -.62 -.83
Monetary shock only .13 .99 .99 .99 .99 – – -.97 -.97 -.13 -.67 -.99
Technology shock only .83 .99 .95 .95 .95 – – .67 .67 -.83 -.62 .40
Search Frictions & Right-To-Manage (Wage Bargaining Only)
Period-by-Period
Both shocks .80 .97 .93 .99 .99 -.60 .95 .99 .99 -.80 -.38 .96
Monetary shock only .92 -.90 .07 .80 .82 -.58 -.56 .02 .02 -.92 -.64 -.56
Technology shock only .92 .99 .93 .99 .99 -.60 .95 .99 .99 -.92 -.53 .96
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks .28 .99 .60 .94 .94 -.28 .75 -.45 -.45 -.28 -.41 -.72
Monetary shock only -.46 .99 .46 .99 .99 .00 .77 -.98 -.98 .46 -.24 -.99
Technology shock only .87 .99 .86 .95 .96 -.48 .98 .85 .85 -.87 -.62 .67
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks .42 .99 .69 .96 .96 -.42 .73 -.62 -.62 -.42 -.59 -.82
Monetary shock only .15 .99 .71 .99 .99 -.45 .71 -.97 -.97 -.15 -.67 -.99
Technology shock only .88 .99 .88 .96 .97 -.52 .96 .85 .85 -.88 -.59 .69
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Table 4: Correlations with Unemployment – RTM
c i n h nh v w a P PP−1
U.S. Economy -.57 -.78 -.92 -.56 -.94 -.93 -.13 -.29 .22 -.41
Search Frictions & Right-To-Manage (Wage Bargaining Only)
Period-by-Period
Both shocks -.68 -.51 -.85 -.50 -.53 -.34 -.68 -.68 .68 -.20
Monetary shock only -.22 .17 -.85 .02 -.02 -.34 -.82 -.82 .22 .48
Technology shock only -.78 -.52 -.85 -.50 -.53 -.35 -.68 -.68 .78 -.29
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks -.77 -.15 -.85 -.04 -.05 -.33 -.43 -.43 .77 -.14
Monetary shock only -.84 .08 -.81 .07 .06 -.26 -.18 -.18 .84 .49
Technology shock only -.79 -.36 -.85 -.20 -.23 -.34 -.84 -.84 .79 -.30
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks -.82 -.30 -.84 -.24 -.25 -.32 -.15 -.15 .82 -.04
Monetary shock only -.93 -.34 -.82 -.37 -.38 -.28 .23 .23 .93 .54
Technology shock only -.79 -.41 -.85 -.30 -.33 -.34 -.82 -.82 .79 -.29
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Table 5: Standard Deviations – Search Frictions and Efficient Bargaining
Relative to the Volatility of Output
y c i n h nh u v w a P P
P−1
U.S. Economy 2.09 .36 2.86 .61 .24 .74 5.31 6.36 .43 .50 1.43 .51
Benchmark
Period-by-Period
Both shocks 1.09 .44 3.29 .06 .22 .26 .94 1.78 .71 .75 .44 .38
Monetary shock only .02 19.00 58.12 .06 .74 .74 .89 1.39 1.09 1.04 19.00 21.47
Technology shock only 1.09 .35 3.19 .06 .22 .26 .94 1.78 .71 .75 .35 .22
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks 1.01 .46 3.26 .12 .19 .27 1.91 6.01 1.43 .83 .46 .40
Monetary shock only .06 4.52 14.55 1.44 .19 1.44 22.57 79.38 19.94 .55 4.52 5.11
Technology shock only 1.01 .36 3.13 .08 .19 .25 1.25 3.22 .64 .83 .36 .23
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks 1.03 .45 3.23 .41 .16 .43 6.35 15.66 1.84 .83 .45 .39
Monetary shock only .26 1.14 5.05 1.48 .08 1.50 23.15 57.24 6.91 .52 1.14 1.27
Technology shock only 1.00 .36 3.07 .16 .16 .22 2.47 6.04 .55 .85 .36 .23
Current Surplus
Period-by-Period
Both shocks 1.09 .44 3.29 .06 .22 .26 .94 1.78 .71 .75 .44 .38
Monetary shock only .02 19.00 58.12 .06 .74 .74 .89 1.39 1.09 1.04 19.00 21.47
Technology shock only 1.09 .35 3.19 .06 .22 .26 .94 1.78 .71 .75 .35 .22
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks .97 .64 3.14 .28 .17 .32 4.46 8.51 1.64 .90 .64 .56
Monetary shock only .18 2.34 4.46 1.55 .03 1.57 24.32 46.81 8.63 .57 2.34 2.51
Technology shock only .96 .49 3.09 .05 .17 .16 .81 1.15 .52 .91 .49 .33
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks .94 1.19 3.43 .19 .25 .37 3.02 5.72 2.29 .96 1.19 1.01
Monetary shock only .20 4.35 8.93 .88 1.10 1.68 13.78 26.20 10.06 .69 4.35 4.03
Technology shock only .92 .74 2.90 .03 .07 .07 .41 .70 .72 .98 .74 .53
Contemporaneous Hiring
Period-by-Period
Both shocks 1.12 .43 3.19 .15 .20 .31 2.38 1.88 .66 .70 .43 .37
Monetary shock only .02 18.77 56.30 .14 .72 .75 2.20 1.60 1.03 1.00 18.77 21.21
Technology shock only 1.12 .35 3.10 .15 .20 .31 2.38 1.88 .66 .70 .35 .22
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks 1.14 .42 3.30 .49 .15 .53 7.69 8.61 1.24 .72 .42 .36
Monetary shock only .30 1.00 5.45 1.62 .20 1.52 25.43 29.06 4.33 .53 1.00 1.13
Technology shock only 1.11 .34 3.09 .26 .15 .37 4.12 4.34 .55 .73 .34 .22
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks 1.33 .37 3.37 .87 .11 .87 13.64 12.52 1.39 .66 .37 .31
Monetary shock only .70 .45 4.11 1.53 .11 1.52 23.91 21.83 2.51 .53 .45 .48
Technology shock only 1.13 .34 3.03 .38 .11 .40 5.95 5.66 .46 .70 .34 .21
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Table 6: Correlations with Output – Search Frictions and Efficient Bargaining
correlations with output
c i n h nh u v w a P PP−1 (a, nh)
U.S. Economy .65 .94 .78 .72 .87 -.84 .90 .24 .70 -.37 .23 .27
Benchmark
Period-by-Period
Both shocks .73 .96 .97 .97 .99 -.67 .91 .99 .99 -.73 -.31 .98
Monetary shock only .69 -.65 .74 .25 .32 -.90 .31 .56 .74 -.69 -.61 -.40
Technology shock only .92 .99 .97 .97 .99 -.67 .91 .99 .99 -.92 -.51 .98
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks .71 .96 .64 .94 .70 -.55 .29 .36 .97 -.71 -.28 .52
Monetary shock only -.26 .65 .18 -.43 .96 -.98 -.44 -.60 -.71 .26 -.62 -.87
Technology shock only .93 .99 .97 .95 .72 -.77 .59 .87 .98 -.93 -.44 .56
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks .66 .98 .46 .89 .56 -.49 .18 .02 .90 -.66 -.37 .15
Monetary shock only -.15 .97 .64 -.40 .99 -.99 -.02 -.82 -.95 .15 -.59 -.98
Technology shock only .93 .99 .86 .94 .72 -.71 .53 .77 .98 -.93 -.45 .59
Current Surplus
Period-by-Period
Both shocks .73 .96 .97 .97 .99 -.67 .91 .99 .99 -.73 -.31 .98
Monetary shock only .69 -.65 .74 .25 .32 -.90 .31 .56 .74 -.69 -.61 -.40
Technology shock only .92 .99 .97 .97 .99 -.67 .91 .99 .99 -.92 -.51 .98
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks .68 .96 .08 .94 .44 -.16 -.05 .13 .95 -.68 -.33 .13
Monetary shock only -.13 .41 .83 -.05 .99 -.99 .29 -.73 -.99 .13 -.48 -.99
Technology shock only .95 .99 -.43 .96 .60 .14 -.80 .86 .99 -.95 -.45 .48
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks .54 .86 .04 .20 .28 -.13 -.09 .19 .93 -.54 -.29 -.08
Monetary shock only -.14 .51 .53 .35 .99 -.75 .07 -.41 -.97 .14 -.30 -.99
Technology shock only .97 .99 -.67 .47 .37 .30 -.91 .95 .99 -.97 -.46 .31
Contemporaneous Hiring
Period-by-Period
Both shocks .74 .96 .98 .94 .98 -.71 .90 .99 .99 -.74 -.30 .95
Monetary shock only .70 -.66 .96 .25 .38 -.79 .84 .54 .71 -.70 -.58 -.37
Technology shock only .92 .99 .98 .94 .98 -.71 .90 .99 .99 -.92 -.48 .96
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks .66 .97 .56 .83 .72 -.62 .20 .25 .86 -.66 -.36 .27
Monetary shock only -.24 .99 .53 -.24 .99 -.99 -.12 -.52 -.96 .24 -.62 -.98
Technology shock only .92 .98 .89 .94 .82 -.79 .49 .89 .96 -.92 -.40 .61
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks .58 .97 .63 .61 .76 -.74 .24 -.21 .50 -.58 -.45 -.17
Monetary shock only -.04 .97 .73 -.21 .99 -.99 .14 -.79 -.98 .04 -.61 -.99
Technology shock only .91 .98 .88 .94 .83 -.79 .53 .79 .95 -.91 -.39 .62
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Table 7: Correlations with Unemployment – Search Frictions and Efficient Bargaining
c i n h nh v w a P PP−1
U.S. Economy -.57 -.78 -.92 -.56 -.94 -.93 -.13 -.29 .22 -.41
Benchmark
Period-by-Period
Both shocks -.62 -.60 -.84 -.52 -.68 -.31 -.68 -.67 .62 -.14
Monetary shock only -.38 .33 -.92 .10 .03 -.55 -.78 -.89 .38 .30
Technology shock only -.78 -.62 -.84 -.52 -.68 -.31 -.68 -.67 .78 -.25
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks -.22 -.64 -.41 -.40 -.76 .27 .21 -.41 .22 .28
Monetary shock only .33 -.72 -.24 .42 -.99 .39 .66 .81 -.33 .58
Technology shock only -.74 -.77 -.63 -.64 -.82 .03 -.78 -.67 .74 -.20
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks -.06 -.62 -.67 -.20 -.93 -.01 .69 -.10 .06 .42
Monetary shock only .19 -.97 -.67 .40 -.99 -.01 .83 .97 -.19 .58
Technology shock only -.61 -.75 -.68 -.67 -.69 -.02 -.38 -.65 .61 -.13
Current Surplus
Period-by-Period
Both shocks -.62 -.60 -.84 -.52 -.68 -.31 -.68 -.67 .62 -.14
Monetary shock only -.38 .33 -.92 .10 .03 -.55 -.78 -.89 .38 .30
Technology shock only -.78 -.62 -.84 -.52 -.68 -.31 -.68 -.67 .78 -.25
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks .14 -.10 -.83 -.03 -.85 -.31 .72 .13 -.14 .43
Monetary shock only .14 -.40 -.83 .04 -.99 -.30 .73 .99 -.14 .49
Technology shock only .43 .04 -.95 -.15 .06 -.68 .60 .14 -.43 .38
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks .38 -.13 -.84 -.65 -.79 -.31 .71 .17 -.38 .42
Monetary shock only .43 -.25 -.84 -.65 -.80 -.31 .73 .87 -.43 .45
Technology shock only .52 .18 -.89 -.63 -.28 -.44 .55 .33 -.52 .44
Contemporaneous Hiring
Period-by-Period
Both shocks -.63 -.66 -.82 -.47 -.81 -.33 -.67 -.66 .63 -.14
Monetary shock only -.50 .46 -.87 -.13 -.31 -.43 -.44 -.56 .50 .00
Technology shock only -.78 -.68 -.83 -.47 -.81 -.33 -.67 -.66 .78 -.24
2-Period Contracts
Both shocks -.13 -.77 -.55 -.26 -.96 .10 .22 -.15 .13 .37
Monetary shock only .26 -.99 -.52 .24 -.99 .13 .50 .97 -.26 .60
Technology shock only -.66 -.87 -.61 -.69 -.95 .03 -.71 -.61 .66 -.14
4-Period Contracts
Both shocks -.13 -.83 -.73 -.12 -.99 -.14 .65 .19 .13 .43
Monetary shock only .07 -.97 -.73 .22 -.99 -.15 .79 .98 -.07 .60
Technology shock only -.61 -.88 -.70 -.71 -.96 -.10 -.47 -.58 .61 -.11
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